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The Impact of Private Equity on Management
Practices in European Buy-outs: Short-termism,
Anglo-Saxon, or Host Country Effects?
NICK BACON, MIKE WRIGHT, MIGUEL MEULEMAN, and
LOUISE SCHOLES*
This article explores the impact of private equity (PE) firms on human resource
management practices in buy-outs using data drawn from the first representative
pan-European survey into this issue. The findings suggest the overall impact of
PE on high-performance work practices (HPWP) is affected more by length of
the investment relationship than the countries where PE is going to or is coming
from. PE investment results in the increased use of HPWP in buy-outs the longer
the anticipated time to exit. With respect to the PE firms’ country of origin, buy-
outs backed by Anglo-Saxon PE firms are as likely to introduce new HPWP (and
are specifically more likely to extend performance-related pay schemes) as those
backed by non-Anglo-Saxon PE firms, suggesting some adaptation to the local
host country contexts of buy-outs.
Introduction
A BROAD POLITICAL ECONOMY DEBATE HAS RECENTLY DEVELOPED IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES to understand the increasing prominence of financial market
institutions, their impact on corporate governance, and the possible transition
to a new stage of financial market capitalism or fund-driven capitalism (ITUC
2007; PSE 2007; TSC 2007). One particular area of interest concerns the
impact of the activities of financial market institutions on the conduct and out-
comes of employment relations (Blair and Kochan 2000; Pendleton and Gos-
pel 2006). To understand this impact, recent work has expanded the range of
institutions and actors traditionally regarded as comprising the industrial rela-
tions system with a specific focus developing on the role of private equity
firms (Pendleton and Westcott 2009; Wood and Wright 2010).
* The authors’ affiliations are, respectively, Nick Bacon, Cass Business School; Mike Wright, Imperial
College Business School; Miguel Meuleman, Vlerick Business School; and Louise Scholes, Nottingham
University Business School.
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Private equity firms use investor funds to change corporate governance
arrangements through buy-outs of firms (Gilligan and Wright 2010). In lever-
aged buy-outs (hereafter termed buy-outs), private equity investors and often a
management team raise equity (together with debt finance) to buy shares in
the buy-out company from its current owners and resell them after a certain
period of time to distribute the divestment gains to their investors (Gilligan
and Wright 2010). Buy-outs may involve an incumbent management team
(a management buy-out or MBO) or their replacement by an external manage-
ment team (a management buy-in or MBI).
From an agency theory perspective, in effecting buy-outs from often diffuse
and distant owners of public-listed corporations or divisions of such firms, pri-
vate equity firms reduce the gap between owners and managers (Jensen 1986).
This involves using equity incentives to realign interests of owners and manag-
ers, encouraging managers to reduce unnecessary costs, and avoid investment in
low-benefit or value-destroying activities. Tighter financial monitoring makes
managers potentially more accountable to private equity investors. Commit-
ments to service debt taken on at buy-out bring pressures to reduce expenditure,
improve operational efficiencies, and eliminate unprofitable operations. Private
equity funds are therefore active investors seeking to improve the performance
of under-performing firms by refining the strategic focus of the firm and
enhancing the quality of management decision making, often by recruiting more
competent managers. Such changes often lead to firm-level restructuring with
broader consequences for corporate competitiveness and employees’ terms and
conditions (Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 2007; Kaplan and Stromberg 2008).
Interest in private equity investors has increased because the buy-out market
grew to such significant levels in 2005–2008 that this was likely to have mac-
roeconomic implications (Lerner and Gurung 2008). Estimates suggest, for
example, that 19 percent of UK employees worked in firms either currently or
previously owned by private equity firms (TSC 2007).
The implications have been keenly debated in Europe from 2006 as large
U.S. and UK private equity funds became more active and the private equity
industry developed from an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon to become part of glo-
bal developments in financial markets affecting mainland Europe (Kaplan and
Stromberg 2008; Wright et al. 2007). Inquiries into the potentially negative
effects of highly leveraged deals have subsequently been conducted by a num-
ber of organizations including the International Monetary Fund, the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Central
Bank (2007). Debates on this issue have ranged from public hearings to pro-
posed legislative reform in, among other places, the European Parliament, the
German Bundestag, and UK House of Commons (Evans and Habbard 2008;
TSC 2007). One outcome of these debates is the EC Directive on Alternative
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Investment Fund Managers passed by the European Parliament in 2010 and
which comes into force in 2013.
This article contributes to the broader regulatory debate concerning the
impact of private equity activity by reporting the first systematic pan-European
study of the impact of private equity buy-outs on firm-level human resource
management practices. The survey conducted in 2008 provided data on a rep-
resentative sample of 190 European private equity–backed buy-outs. The arti-
cle seeks to explain changes in firm-level human resource management
practices as a result of private equity buy-outs, evaluating whether these
changes vary according to: anticipated time to exit of private equity investors
to assess the impact of short-term orientations; whether the lead private equity
investor is Anglo-Saxon or foreign (country of origin effects); and whether
these effects are tempered by the institutional environment of the buy-out in
which private equity invests (host country effects). The article therefore
uniquely combines a focus on the role of private equity firms as new financial
actors, with institutional business systems effects, by comparing the impact of
Anglo-Saxon private equity funds with private equity funds from mainland
Europe, and considering the impact of private equity buy-outs in both liberal
and coordinated market economies in Europe.
Private Equity Buy-Outs and Management Practices
The broader impact of private equity on national ownership and corporate
governance has caused significant concern because U.S. and UK private equity
funds are regarded as extending the market for corporate control beyond liberal
market economies and promoting a short-term view of ownership associated
with the Anglo-Saxon shareholder value model of corporate governance
(Evans and Habbard 2008). International trade union organizations (Monks
2006; Rasmussen 2009) and European socialists in particular have expressed
concern about ‘‘the shorter time horizon and changed behaviors of these finan-
cial actors’’ (PSE 2007:16). In these debates, private equity firms such as
KKR, Blackstone, and Permira are accused of restructuring buy-outs to
increase short-term financial performance for a quick sale and thereby ‘‘mak-
ing short-term returns at the expense of workers’’ (ITUC 2007:21), rather than
investing in management practices that will build long-term value (IUF 2007;
PSE 2007:17). According to critics, this undermines longer-term links between
shareholders and firms in coordinated market economies (PSE 2007: 19),
where ‘‘patient capital … had a longer investment horizon in terms of their
commitment to the firm’’ (Watt and Galgoczi 2009:195). In exporting Anglo-
Saxon financial practices into Continental Europe, private equity is therefore
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regarded as a direct threat to the European social model (Vitols 2008:29) and
the broader aims of the Lisbon Treaty to develop long-term increases in effi-
ciency, productivity, and growth (PSE 2007:19).
Specific concerns have been expressed about the ‘‘worrying implications’’
of short-term ownership for ‘‘companies’ investments in training and education
of the labour force’’ (PSE 2007:97). According to this view, private equity
investors have little interest in developing high skills and extensive training,
sharing gains with employees, or promoting fairness at work. In addition, trade
unions also argue that operational efficiencies are achieved at workers’ expense
with the drive to reduce employment costs involving reductions in employ-
ment, wages, and an intensification of working conditions (Monks 2006; PSE
2007:19–20). Given such claims, detailed studies of changes in a variety of
management practices following private equity–backed buy-outs are required.
Existing systematic research based on the data drawn from corporations’
annual reports or government plant-level surveys indicates that, in contrast to the
claims above, employees in buy-outs benefit from more secure jobs and possibly
increased employment resulting from reduced agency costs, improved strategic
and operational capabilities, and hence more viable businesses. Generally, these
studies mainly conducted in liberal market economies report an initial decline in
employment in private equity–backed buy-outs followed by subsequent
increases in employment (Amess and Wright 2007; Boucly, Thesmar, and Sraer
2009; Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero 2007; Davis et al. 2008).
The first wave of UK buy-outs also introduced new high-performance work
practices (HPWP; Bacon, Wright, and Demina 2004; Bacon et al. 2008;
Wright, Bacon, and Amess 2009; Wright, Coyne, and Lockley 1984; Wright
et al. 1990). HPWP may be introduced to increase productivity because many
private equity–backed buy-outs exploit growth and entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties rather than concentrating only on reducing costs (Meuleman et al. 2009;
Wright and Coyne 1985; Wright et al. 2000). For example, UK and the
Netherlands buy-outs introduced new incentive pay schemes, greater team-
based working and functional flexibility, and increased levels of employee
training (Bacon et al. 2008; Bruining et al. 2005; Wright, Bacon, and Amess
2009). Other studies also report expansion of financial incentive schemes
(Ernst & Young 2008:7).
As the debate has matured, critics of private equity have acknowledged
more evidence is required (Clark 2009b; Watt 2008) and recognized that pri-
vate equity generates gains from managing financial assets rather than through
labor management (Folkman, Froud, and Williams 2009). It is thus difficult to
classify all private equity companies as good or bad because they pursue a
range of strategies including growth-orientated and longer-term investment
strategies (Muller 2006). It is also unlikely that firms had made extensive
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investments in human capital prior to the buy-out that could be reversed after-
ward given the limited adoption of such practices by publicly traded corpora-
tions in liberal market economies (Morgan 2009:224).
It is unclear, however, whether the positive effects of private equity reported
in the United States and the UK are European-wide or limited to liberal market
economies where private equity firms can enhance the performance of buy-
outs by improving on the traditional under-investment in HPWP by listed
firms. To shed more light on this issue and consider the impact of PE across
Europe and in coordinated market economies, this article analyzes the impact
of private equity on HPWP in buy-outs across Europe by comparing practices
prior to and following a private equity buy-out in different national contexts.
Time to Exit, Anglo-Saxon Investors and Foreign Investors
The extent to which management practices change as a result of private
equity investments in buy-outs may vary according to at least four issues that
are the focus of this article: the anticipated time to exit of private equity inves-
tors; whether private equity investors are Anglo-Saxon; whether the lead inves-
tor is a foreign PE firm; and host country differences in capital and labor
market regulatory regimes in which private equity invests. This section
explores these issues.
As active investors, private equity firms are accused of seeking a quicker
return on investment than diffuse shareholders, and combined with the debt
incurred on buy-outs, they are accused of imposing a short-term orientation
which ‘‘narrows the range of possible management decisions’’ (Watt and
Galgoczi 2009:197). European socialist parties argue that short-term financial
ownership, estimated at 3–4 years (PSE 2007:18), does not provide the long-
term investments required to make firms competitive, as ‘‘private equity funds
are based on investment strategies with a much shorter time horizon than is
needed’’ (PSE 2007:15). These short-term aims for buy-outs ‘‘generally
includes pressure on wages, benefits and working conditions’’ (ITUC 2007:5),
‘‘… thereby strengthening firms’ financial objectives to the detriment of
investment, employment and industrial strategy’’ (Bonnard and Mermet
2009:303). Concentrating on short-term goals may reduce expenditure to
develop employee skills and competencies (Watt 2008:557). Watt and Gal-
goczi (2009:203), however, acknowledge that the impact of anticipated time to
exit has received little systematic study.
Although private equity investors are often considered short-term investors,
the average length of private equity investment is in fact around 5 years and
increasing (Stro¨mberg 2008; Wright et al. 2007). This is longer than the
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average investment in listed company stocks by institutional investors (Ach-
arya, Kehoe, and Reyner 2009; Gottschalg 2007). Studies have found little evi-
dence of short-termism as a result of private equity ownership when measuring
R&D, investment, and sustainability (Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 2007;
Watt and Galgoczi 2009:203). Arguably, this is because private equity firms
release managers from the short-term expectations of diffuse investors in a
listed corporation. Alternatively, the lack of longer-term investments by the
buy-out may reduce its subsequent sale price (Watt and Galgoczi 2009:203).
Another plausible explanation is that the anticipated timescale to exit depends
on the business plan to create value from the investment. A longer timescale
to exit is likely to involve a buy-and-build strategy to create value, and invest-
ment in human capital is likely to be part of such plans. In addition, timescale
to exit is likely to affect the financial value of investments in HR practices,
with greater returns anticipated where investors plan to hold the buy-out firm
for longer, and thereby expect to be able to realize value from human capital
investments. This article therefore assesses the impact of private equity short-
term orientations by evaluating whether changes to HPWP vary according to
the anticipated time to exit of the private equity investors.
It is widely recognized that transfer of business practices across borders often
reflects both the business system of the country of origin of the parent company
and host country effects (Clark 2009a; Ferner 2009). The importance of institu-
tional context for the debate over the impact of private equity may usefully be
explored by assessing whether Anglo-Saxon private equity investors export
employment practices found in liberal market economies when investing in
coordinated market economies. The activity of U.S. private equity funds such
as Blackstone and KKR (PSE 2007:14–15), and larger European private equity
funds like Permira and CVC, has caused particular concern in mainland Europe.
During 1999–2007, 21 percent of UK deal value was accounted for by private
equity investors of U.S. origin; the corresponding percentage in Continental
Europe was 14 percent (CMBOR 2008). Despite portraying U.S. and UK pri-
vate equity investors as ‘‘barbarians at the gate’’ (Boselie and Koene 2010), no
research has assessed whether they have a different impact on management
practices than non-Anglo-Saxon private equity investors. Thus, we focus on
whether management practices change as a result of investment by Anglo-
Saxon private equity investors compared to non-Anglo-Saxon counterparts and
whether the private equity investor was foreign to the context where it invested.
Host country institutional effects where private equity invests may also
temper the extent to which changes are made to employment relations. Institu-
tional host country constraints affect HR issues in the subsidiaries of multi-
national companies (MNCs; Almond et al. 2005; Ferner et al. 2004). Similar
effects may be more pronounced in private equity buy-outs because private
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equity firms are more decentralized than public corporations and rely on
financial incentives rather than direct monitoring and bureaucratic oversight of
management practices (Jensen 1989). This article therefore considers the
impact of host country differences in capital and labor market regulatory
regimes on employment relations changes in private equity–backed buy-outs.
Method
Data. Our analysis is based on a novel dataset that combines both question-
naire survey and archival data. The Centre for Management Buy-out Research
(CMBOR) database provided the basis for the archival data and the question-
naire survey. The CMBOR database contains details of the population of Euro-
pean buy-outs since the late 1970s. To identify deals, a twice-yearly survey of
all private equity firms, intermediaries, and banks active in the buy-out market
is conducted obtaining a full response rate; these respondents receive a free
report analyzing market trends. Press, annual corporate reports, and stock
exchange circulars are used to gather additional data. The dataset has no upper
or lower size limit and includes both publicly declared buy-outs as well as
confidential deals. The CMBOR database was used as an archival source for
variables relating to the private equity firm’s prior experience and for variables
relating to the buy-out’s characteristics concerning location, size, profits, type,
and timing of buy-out. To identify additional private equity firm characteristics
such as the home country of the lead PE investor, we relied on the Thomson
Venture Economics database.
Representative industrial relations data were gathered through a survey and the
CMBOR database was used to provide the population of firms to be surveyed.
The survey focused on private equity–backed buy-outs completed during 2002–
2006, which allowed time for post-buy-out changes to take place, to not be too
far in the past to avoid recall bias, and to cover the period of the recent wave of
private equity buy-outs. The survey was undertaken in the first half of 2008 and
comprised responses from 190 private equity–backed buy-outs across Europe.
The questionnaire was translated into French, Spanish, German, and Italian
and sent to companies with more than fifty employees identified using the
CMBOR database. This size cut-off was used because these firms are more
likely to have formal management practices. The CEO, or HR Director, was
contacted either by email (when possible) or by post. Reminders were sent
after 2 weeks. Out of 2597 contacted, 190 companies replied; a response rate
of 7.3 percent. Response rates to mail questionnaire surveys are falling. This
response is in line with other pan-European studies of managers’ perceptions.
Scholes et al. (2007) find a 7 percent response rate in a sample of European
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family firm buy-outs; Lockett et al. (2008) obtain a 10 percent response rate
for a sample of venture capital–backed exporters in Europe.
Most respondents were at least at director level (88 percent), the remainder
being senior managers, indicating a close familiarity with the issues covered
by the survey. Although using multiple respondents from the same firm may
reduce response error, using scarce research resources on finding multiple
informed raters reduces sample size, and we therefore concentrated resources
on key informants and a larger sample size (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson
1993). Trade union representatives or employees may have different views of
events. It should be noted, however, that many private equity–backed deals are
not unionized, and independent employees’ representatives would be difficult
to locate. The findings are thus limited by dependence upon managerial per-
ceptions, although such views are of intrinsic interest. Nevertheless, we do
incorporate a measure of whether or not trade unions were recognized.
The main characteristics of the surveyed companies were compared with the
features of the population of European buy-outs in the CMBOR database to
assess representativeness. The representative nature of the sample was assessed
on the basis of several criteria: country of location, industrial sector, deal size,
and whether the business had been profitable or loss making at the time of the
buy-out. The sample has a good fit with the population across countries with
two exceptions: French companies are underrepresented, while British compa-
nies are, to a lesser extent, overrepresented. This reflects well-known differ-
ences in response rates to survey instruments across Europe (Bygrave, Hay,
and Peeters 1994). The sample is fairly representative of the population in
terms of industrial sectors: Industrial products and consumer related are
slightly overrepresented, while services are a little underrepresented. In terms
of deal size (as measured by transaction value in € million), the sample com-
prised a higher proportion of large buy-outs and a lower share of the smallest
buy-outs compared with the population. Comparison of the average number of
employees in the sample with the population of buy-out firms on the CMBOR
database showed that the sample contained slightly more large firms and
slightly fewer medium-sized firms. The sample compared with the population
showed a slight underrepresentation of poor performers. The distribution of
MBOs and MBIs in the sample and population is very similar.
Variable Definition. The variables used in the analysis are defined in
Table 1.
Dependent variables: High performance work practices were measured
using a count variable constructed from responses indicating the presence or
absence of a range of practices commonly included in the previous studies of
HPWP and performance (reviewed in Combs et al. 2006). The precise items
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used are taken from the previous studies as described in Guest et al. (2003)
and cover HR practices to ensure employees possess the necessary skills, have
the opportunitiy to contribute discretionary effort, are treated fairly to elicit
employee commitment, and are motivated to contribute. As factor analysis did
not reveal coherent bundles of practices, a count variable is used. The ques-
tions concentrate on practices rather than policies to reduce measurement error,
and the rating scales vary given no consensus exists as to the most reliable rat-
ing scales (Huselid and Becker 2000). It is not possible to assess measurement
error because of item reliability, and this is an important restriction when inter-
preting the results. We utilized four dependent variables: Change in HPWP;
Change in work organization, and functional flexibility reflecting skills and the
opportunity to contribute (such as formal training, flexible job descriptions and
work time, and team working, etc.); Change in fairness practices that provide
fairness of treatment to enhance employee commitment (such as harmonized
terms and conditions, security of employment, and formal grievance proce-
dures); and Change in performance-related pay schemes intended to motivate
employees to perform (such as profit-related pay) (see the definitions in
Table 1 for full details). The last three were the subsets of the first and were
derived from the questionnaire.
Independent variables: Timescale to exit was derived from the questionnaire
survey and was defined as the intended time to exit at the time of the buy-out
on the basis that expected timescale for holding the investment will likely
influence the strategy that is put in place. Whether the investor was an Anglo-
Saxon PE firm was obtained from the Thomson Venture Economics database.
Our dataset includes Anglo-Saxon private equity investors from the UK (65
deals), the United States (30 deals), Australia (4 deals), and Ireland (1 deal).1
We also included a variable, Foreign PE firm, which identified whether the
lead investor’s head office or main activity lay outside the buy-out’s home
location. Evidence strongly shows that syndicate leads play the key role in
interactions with buy-out companies (Wright and Lockett 2003). Many private
equity funds cover several countries rather than one country. Although there is
some limited autonomy for PE firms in local environments, the head office
investment committee likely sets overall investment policy and approves
investment decisions (Pruthi, Wright, and Lockett 2003). As national differ-
ences in employment legislation across Europe may lead to different outcomes
from changes in ownership (Bo¨ttger 2006; Watt 2008), we included the loca-
1 We tested whether there were different effects for these different Anglo-Saxon countries but except for
the effect on change in performance-related pay schemes, we found no differences. Separate results indicated
that the effect of Anglo-Saxon PE firms on changes in performance-related pay schemes was only observed
for UK PE firms. The effect of U.S. PE firms on changes in performance-related pay schemes was positive
but not significant.
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tion of the private equity buy-out as a control variable using the CMBOR
database. We distinguish between four regions: Anglo-Saxon region, Northern
European region, Central European region, and Mediterranean region.
Control variables: We controlled for a number of factors. The experience of
the private equity investor may be related to the extent to which they are
involved in making changes in the companies in which they invest (Cressy,
Munari, and Malipiero 2007). Accordingly, we control for the general invest-
ment experience of the private equity firm; this variable was obtained from the
CMBOR database. As the extent to which changes in management practices
have been changed may be influenced by the length of time that the firm has
had a buy-out structure, we control for Time since buy-out, and this variable was
derived from the CMBOR database. We controlled for Type of buy-out using
data from the CMBOR database as there is evidence of different approaches by
insider (MBO) and outsider (MBI) driven buy-outs (Bacon, Wright, and Demina
2004; Bacon et al. 2008). As management practices may be influenced by firm
size, we controlled for this using data from the questionnaire survey (Size of
buy-out). As the nature of management practices may also be influenced by
whether the firm recognizes trade unions for negotiating pay and conditions, we
controlled for Trade union recognition using the questionnaire survey. Profit-
able on buy-out was derived from the CMBOR database and also included.
Results
Descriptives. Table 2 provides a description of the variables used in the
analyses. The change in the HPWP variable shows that the median firm does
not introduce any new practices. The mean firm introduces one new practice
with a maximum of ten new practices and a minimum of )3 practices, that is, a
reduction of three practices. The same results are reflected in the change in
work organization and functional flexibility, the change in fairness practices,
and the change in performance-related pay schemes. However, the standard
deviations indicate considerable variation in the sample. The mean and median
expected timescale to exit is 4–5 years. In total, 57 percent of the deals involve
an Anglo-Saxon PE firm, and 45 percent of the lead private equity investors are
foreign. The control variables indicate considerable variation among the buy-
outs and the PE firms. Table 2 shows that 42 percent of firms have trade union
recognition. The correlations between all the independent and control variables
used in the regression analyses are equal to or below 0.49 (Table 3).
Bivariate Analysis. In Table 4, we present bivariate statistics combining our
general measure of HPWP and our main independent variables to compare
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HPWP before and after the buy-out. Panel A of Table 4 shows that in each of
the institutional contexts there is a significant increase in the use of HPWP with
the exception of Northern Europe where this change is only marginally signifi-
cant. The chi-square statistics indicate that there are significant differences in
the use of HPWP between the different institutional contexts before but not
after the buy-out. Panel B indicates that the largest and most significant
changes occur in buy-outs where private equity investors have a longer time-
scale to exit. The difference between these groups is only marginally significant
after the buy-out. Panel C illustrates that both Anglo-Saxon investors and other
investors significantly increase the use of HPWP after the buy-out. The chi-
square statistics show that Anglo-Saxon investors use HPWP more than other
investors both before the buy-out and after the buy-out. Last, panel D shows
that both local and foreign investors significantly implement more HPWP after
the buy-out. There is no significant difference between these two groups.
Multivariate Analysis. We conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions to analyze the impact of our independent variables on the change in
HPWP after the buy-out. As investments in the same country may not be trea-
ted as independent given common institutional arrangements and norms, we
TABLE 2
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Variables N Mean Median SD Min Max
Dependent variables
Change HPWP 158 1.41 0 2.48 )3 10
Change work organization and functional flexibility 158 0.69 0 1.35 )3 6
Change fairness practices 158 0.30 0 0.83 )1 3
Change performance-related pay schemes 158 0.86 0 3.38 )11 17
Independent variables
Timescale to exit 158 3.17 3 1.05 1 6
Foreign PE firm 158 0.45 0 0.49 0 1
Anglo-Saxon PE firm 158 0.57 1 0.50 0 1
Liberal Europe 158 0.45 0 0.50 0 1
Northern Europe 158 0.12 0 0.32 0 1
Central Europe 158 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
Mediterranean 158 0.19 0 0 1
Control variables
Experience PE firm 158 115.17 15 357.79 0 1748
Time since buy-out 158 3.27 3 1.30 2 7
Profitable on buy-out 158 0.96 1 0.20 0 1
Size of the buy-out 158 4273.34 360 22507.26 50 280000
Type of buy-out (1 ⁄ 0) 158 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
Trade union recognition 158 0.42 0 0.49 0 1
Mediterranean region 158 0.20 0 0.40 0 1
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correct the standard errors using the clustering option in Stata. This method
gives efficient estimates of the coefficients and improved standard errors (Froot
1989). In each regression, we controlled for the use of HPWP as reflected in
the dependent variable in the year before the buy-out.
All models presented in Table 5 are highly significant and have reasonable
r-squares. Models 1 and 2 indicate that a longer timescale to exit is positively
related to a change in HPWP after the buy-out. The coefficient is positive and
highly significant. Anglo-Saxon and foreign PE involvement is not signifi-
cantly related to a change in HPWP after the buy-out. In model 2, the interac-
tion between foreign PE firm and Anglo-Saxon PE firm is introduced to test
whether Anglo-Saxon PE firms behave similarly when operating abroad. This
interaction effect is not significant, however. The control variables indicate that
trade union recognition is only weakly negatively related to a change in
HPWP as a whole but not to any of the three constituent elements. Further,
the more the HPWP is in use before the buy-out, the lower the change in
HPWP after the buy-out. Similar results are obtained when looking separately
at the change in work organization and functional flexibility and the change in
TABLE 4
HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES BEFORE AND AFTER THE BUY-OUT
N
High-Performance
Work Practices Before Buy-out
High-Performance
Work Practices After Buy-outb
Panel A: Institutional context
Liberal Europe 82 7.57 8.98***
Northern Europe 19 8.38 9.11†
Central Europe 41 7.70 8.88***
Mediterranean Europe 34 5.74 7.79***
Average 176 7.34 8.73***
Chi-squarea 13.68** 4.74
Panel B: Timescale to exit
<3 years 34 7.62 7.97†
4–5 years 111 7.34 8.77***
6> years 36 6.92 9.27***
Chi-squarea 1.06 5.11†
Panel C: Anglo-Saxon versus other investors
Other investor 74 6.47 8.18***
Anglo-Saxon 101 7.97 9.15***
Chi-squarea 11.75*** 5.21*
Panel D: Local versus foreign investors
Local investor 94 10.21 11.59**
Foreign investor 81 10.47 10.93**
Chi-squarea 0.01 0.65
aBased on Kruskal–Wallis test for differences in means.
aBased on Wilcoxon signed rank sum test for differences in matched means.
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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fairness practices as shown in models 3–6. In each model, timescale to exit is
positively related to change in HPWP. The coefficients are positive and highly
significant. None of the interaction effects is significant.
In models 7 and 8, we introduce change in performance-related pay schemes
after the buy-out as the dependent variable. The coefficients of timescale to
exit and the involvement of an Anglo-Saxon PE firm are both positive and
significant. Further, the coefficient of the interaction effect between foreign PE
firm and Anglo-Saxon PE firm involvement is negative and marginally signifi-
cant, meaning that Anglo-Saxon PE firms are less likely to implement these
practices when operating abroad.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article reported the results of the first representative pan-European sur-
vey of managers’ perceptions of the impact of private equity as new financial
actors on HPWP in buy-outs. In contrast to critics’ claims, often based on iso-
lated examples, buy-out managers report private equity investments result in
more HPWP. The findings provide little evidence that private equity involve-
ment prevents investment in HPWP that may damage long-term viability.
The article also evaluated whether changes to HPWP vary according to the
anticipated time to exit of the private equity investors, whether the private
equity investors are Anglo-Saxon, and whether they were foreign to the local
institutional context. Fewer HPWP are reported where private equity firms
anticipate a shorter time to exit. The evidence helps inform the policy debate
regarding whether the short-term orientation of private equity–backed buy-outs
prevent investment in HR practices that may deliver increased levels of
productivity and efficiency over the longer term (PSE 2007). Anglo-Saxon pri-
vate equity buy-outs are just as likely to introduce new HPWP as non-Anglo-
Saxon private equity–backed buy-outs. However, Anglo-Saxon private equity
buy-outs are more likely to extend financial incentives to a greater proportion
of employees.
There was little evidence that changes in HPWP were significantly related
to differences in the social models of the countries where buy-outs were
located. Among the control variables, the level of pre-buy-out HPWP in the
company was significant and negatively related to changes in HPWP. Simi-
larly, controlling for employee voice in terms of the presence of trade union
recognition, we find only a weakly significant negative relationship between
trade union recognition and changes to HPWP only in respect to changes to
HPWP as a whole, not to its three constituent elements. But even after control-
ling for trade union recognition, our results hold.
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Policy Implications. Although European Socialist groups and trade unions
have argued that private equity buy-outs ‘‘reduces the capacity to invest and
manage long-term efficiency, productivity and innovation,’’ the findings indi-
cate the opposite as buy-outs report more HPWP than prior to the buy-out.
Given such practices may result in higher skill levels, increased job satisfaction,
and commitment (Appelbaum et al. 2000), employees may benefit from these
changes. As labor process studies suggest such practices may also be associated
with increased stress levels (Handel and Levine 2004), future work could
explore how these changes affect employee attitudes and work experiences.
It was beyond the scope of this study to examine whether private equity
buy-outs adopting more HPWP also report greater increases in labor productiv-
ity. Further analysis is needed to examine whether the benefits of these prac-
tices in improving employee skills, attitudes, and behaviors outweigh the
costs. Where the perceived timescale to exit is longer, the anticipated benefits
may be greater and the investments more likely.
Although perceived time to exit is associated with introducing new HPWP,
note that few buy-outs with a shorter perceived timescale to exit remove such
practices which were already in place prior to the buy-out. Critics of private
equity suggest this will not be the case because capital markets do not effi-
ciently assess the value of such investments—as a result, longer-term invest-
ments in human capital will not be reflected in the increased sale price of the
buy-out. However, HR executives in private equity buy-outs report that PE
investors and potential purchasing companies conduct extensive assessments of
human capital and HR investments when procuring firms (Bacon et al. 2008).
It is not logical to assume that whether PE firms routinely underinvest in
human capital other PE firms (who are their frequent partners in other deals)
will not take this into account when conducting a secondary buy-out or that
other experienced investment funds will not take this into account when they
are frequent purchasers of shares during IPOs of private equity buy-outs or
that industry purchasers cannot assess the required human capital investments.
The continuing debate on financial market capitalism has created strange
bedfellows, with European socialists defending managerial capitalism and the
separation of management and ownership in the public limited company, and
seeking to protect incumbent managers of under-performing firms (PSE
2007:75, 97). As the most significant uplift in HPWP with the potential to
improve firm productivity occurs in UK buy-outs, most likely from public lim-
ited companies with the clearest separation of ownership and control, it
appears that the employees in the UK may benefit the most from private
equity buy-outs.
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Limitations. This article has a number of limitations that provide opportuni-
ties for further research. First, our study was restricted to single responses from
key HR directors and CEOs. As noted, there are trade-offs to be made
between accessing key respondents who are more likely to be aware of the
specialist issues involved in management practices and the potential loss of
respondents through attempting to obtain multiple responses from the same
firm in what is a quite sensitive area (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993). Fur-
ther studies, however, could attempt to incorporate the perspectives of private
equity firm executives, trade union representatives, and employees. Second, it
might be argued that the study suffers from response bias in that our respon-
dents, as part of the management, may present their management practices in a
positive light. Our visits to twenty firms confirmed the general pattern of sur-
vey findings and did not give any particular reasons to be concerned about
response bias. Third, although we allowed sufficient time after the buy-out for
changes to management practices to have occurred, further longitudinal
research is need to chart the process of changes over time. Future research
might also examine the impact of the credit crisis and recession on manage-
ment practices. Fourth, our study was confined to private equity–backed buy-
outs and did not include a matched non-buy-out control group. A problem
when selecting such a group is in establishing the counterfactual because firms
that experience ownership change are not randomly selected from the popula-
tion (Amess, Girma, and Wright 2008). For instance, firms might be subject to
buy-out because they over-employ and ⁄or make extra-marginal wage payments
that are identified as sources of organizational inefficiency. Fifth, even though
we acknowledge important differences between practices in different Anglo-
Saxon countries, we did not explore this issue in detail given the limited sam-
ple size. It would be useful to explore the differences in more detail in future
research. Finally, critics might suggest a need for caution in interpreting our
results on the grounds that the study was partly funded by the private equity
industry (e.g., Froud et al. 2007). However, the CMBOR database on which
we draw was established to study buy-outs in a comprehensive and objective
way, and output from it has been used by parties from different perspectives
to inform the debate (see Bacon et al. [2010] for details). Our findings are also
consistent with previous government research council–funded studies of man-
agement practices in buy-outs and buy-ins going back some 25 years (Wright,
Bacon, and Amess 2009; Wright, Coyne, and Lockley 1984; Wright et al.
1990).
These limitations notwithstanding, these findings from across Europe
uniquely combined a focus on the role of private equity firms as new financial
actors, with institutional business systems effects, notably the timescale to exit,
the country of origin of private equity funds, and host country of the buy-out.
The Impact of Private Equity on Management Practices / 623
As new financial actors, private equity firms are heterogeneous, in that the extent
to which HPWP are reported depends upon their anticipated timescale to exit.
With respect to institutional differences in the origin of private equity firms, our
finding that buy-outs backed by Anglo-Saxon firms are just as likely to intro-
duce new HPWP as those backed by non-Anglo-Saxon private equity firms sug-
gests some adaptation to local institutional contexts. However, institutional
origin of the private equity backer does seem to matter with respect to extending
financial incentives to cover a greater proportion of employees. Overall, the
impact of private equity on HPWP is positive, and it is affected more by the
length of the relationship, rather than the country where private equity is going
to, or the country where private equity is coming from.
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